

1973TANMUN'26 HISTORICAL-UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY STUDY GUIDE

Agenda Item: Establishing an International Governance Framework for
Antarctica

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Letter from the Secretary General

Distinguished delegates,

I am your Secretary General, Egemen Erkan. First of all, I wish you all a great conference. When we organized the 1973MUN conference, our main goal was to create a new, unparalleled conference that, academically speaking, would allow you to look back and say, "It was worth my time and I gained so much from this." We carefully selected each Under Secretary General for our conference. Each of them is a master in their field and a successful member who will do everything in their power to help you. Thank you all for joining us, and I wish you all the best in your work

Egemen Erkan
Secretary General
1973MUN

Letter from the Deputy Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

My name is Eslem Yanık and I am honored to serve as the Deputy Secretary General of 1973MUN.

1973MUN aspires to be a conference distinguished by its strong academic standards and high quality debate. The true quality of this conference however lies in you your preparation, vision and the depth you bring to discussions. Within the dynamic international context of 1973, I am confident that you will represent your countries with both accuracy and impact.

Speak boldly, think critically, and demonstrate strong diplomacy.

I look forward to your debates.

Best regards,

Eslem Yanık

Deputy Secretary-General

1973MUN

Letter from the Under Secretary General

Honored Delegates,

It's my pleasure to serve as Under Secretary General of the H-UNGA committee in 1973MUN'26. My name is Mustafa Baran Topcu. I'm studying at Ankara Atatürk High School, and it's my honor to come from Ankara to make this committee possible.

Over the next three days, we will be focusing on "Establishing an International Governance Framework for Antarctica." Since this is one of the current global topics, I expect that this committee will present many creative solutions. Me and my academic assistant and I have worked to make this guide as encouraging as possible. I hope you get as much benefit as possible from this guide.

Finally, I would like to thank the Executive and Organization Team for their effort in making such a great conference like that. Also, I shouldn't write this letter without thanking my Academic Assistant Ali Bakım, this committee would be impossible without his help.

Last but not least, I wish all of you three remarkable days and a committee with lots of debates, lots of fun, and new friends. Please feel free to ask if you have questions.

Best Regards,

Mustafa Baran Topcu

Under Secretary General of H-UNGA

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Letter from the Academic Assistant

Dear Delegates,

H-UNGA! It is my pleasure and the honor to act as your Academic Assistant for this conference. I can wait to see all your sessions, ideas and growth in dealing with each other. You may be starting at this your first MUN or the tenth, I hope this will at least empower and spark curiosity to what your council has been like. Academic Assistant (My purpose is to help you with more the academic part of the committee; the agenda items, research tips and resolutions communications). However, I am there before and after the start of this journey in making sure that you are confident. If anything seems weird, weighty or fuzzyness, come at me. There is no pressure to be an expert, just make progress.

An institution which works on peace, collective security and international cooperation on a global scale. Our topics are important nowadays and the range of voices (yours, opinions and ideas) will make a meaningful conversation. Please speak up, collaborate and push yourself.

You are not alone in this. You are a team with us... Chairs, your fellow delegates and myself; we have learned so much together, and we want you to leave your mark on this conference too.

Well done on your “**endless**” efforts and good luck in what you do keep enjoying the ride. Can not wait to see what you will accomplish. If you have any questions regarding the committee or agenda item, you can contact us here.

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Warm regards,

Ali BAKIM

Academic Assistant – Historical-United Nations General Assembly (H-UNGA)

1. Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA or GA) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN), serving as its main deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ. Currently in its 80th session, its powers, composition, functions, and procedures are set out in Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter.

The United Nations General Assembly is responsible for the United Nations budget, appointing the non-permanent members to the Security Council, appointing the secretary-general of the United Nations, receiving reports from other parts of the United Nations System, and making recommendations through resolutions. It also establishes numerous subsidiary organs to advance or assist in its broad mandate. The United Nations General Assembly is the only United Nations organ where all member states have equal representation.

The General Assembly meets under its president or the United Nations secretary-general in annual sessions at the General Assembly Building, within the United Nations headquarters in New York City. The primary phase of these meetings generally runs from September through part of January until all issues are addressed, which is often before the next session starts. It can also reconvene for special and emergency special sessions. The first session was convened on 10 January 1946 in the Methodist Central Hall in London and included representatives of the 51 founding nations.

Most questions are decided in the General Assembly by a simple majority. Each member country has one vote. Voting on certain important questions—namely recommendations on peace and security; budgetary concerns; and the election, admission, suspension, or expulsion of members—is by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. Apart from the approval of budgetary matters, including the adoption of a scale of assessment, Assembly resolutions are not binding on the members. The Assembly may make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the United Nations, except matters of peace and security under the Security Council's consideration.

1.1 Powers and Limitations of the General Assembly

Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. Composed of all 193 Members of the United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a central role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law.

The Assembly makes recommendations to States on international issues within its competence. It has also taken actions across all pillars of the United Nations, including with regard to political, economic, humanitarian, social and legal matters. In September 2015, the Assembly agreed on a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals, contained in the outcome document of the United Nations Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda (resolution 70/1 entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”). In 2022, the Assembly held a series of meetings to discuss the recommendations put forward by the Secretary-General in his report entitled “Our Common Agenda”, an agenda of action, designed to strengthen and accelerate multilateral agreements – particularly the 2030 Agenda – and make a tangible difference in people’s lives.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly may:

- Consider and approve the United Nations budget and establish the financial assessments of Member States
- Elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of other United Nations councils and organs and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, appoint the Secretary-General
- Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament
- Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, make recommendations on it
- Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations

- Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in the economic, social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields
- Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among countries
- Consider reports from the Security Council and other United Nations organs.

The Assembly may also take action in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, when the Security Council has failed to act owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. In such instances, according to its “Uniting for peace” resolution of 3 November 1950, the Assembly may consider the matter immediately and recommend to its Members collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

2. Historical Claims and Sovereignty Disputes

Territorial disputes can last decades, potentially a century or more. Some of these disputes do not end even after a decisive war; the losing side in a military defeat may simply refuse to relinquish its claim. Nor are states always willing to accept side payments to settle such disputes, despite significant costs associated with continued tension and the threat of war. Taiwan, Jerusalem, and the Falkland Islands are just a few such territorial disputes that have defied a bargaining solution. Notably, in each of these disputes at least one side has claimed historical ownership and has consistently made an all-or-nothing demand regarding the sovereignty of the disputed territory.

Territorial claims do not arise arbitrarily, nor do their justifications. To make sense of the domestic processes engendered by claims of historical ownership, it is important to ask why leaders invoke such justifications in the first place. In their study of the origin of territorial disputes, Abramson and Carter demonstrate that historical precedents provide both opportunity and incentives for leaders to make territorial claims. In particular, a territorial claim based on historical precedents is often viewed by other states as more legitimate than a claim based on arguments about ethnic ties or resources and signals the

limit of the state's territorial designs (675–78). Historical ownership, which is based on priority or duration, narrows the set of historical precedents that should matter to a claim, strengthening the appearance of legitimacy and limit.² Moreover, rooted in the Western concept of property rights, the argument of historical ownership often carries with it grievances toward those who took away a territory from its rightful owner. Such grievances can mobilize domestic support and gain international legitimacy. Thus, historical ownership makes a particularly attractive justification for a territorial claim.

Making a territorial claim, however, is only the beginning of a long process that involves bargaining in the shadow of war. While foreign policy decisions are made by leaders, there is abundant empirical evidence—from politically and culturally diverse countries—that once sensitive foreign policy issues, especially territorial disputes, are played out in the public arena, leaders can come under tremendous pressure to meet public expectations. Observations of prominent territorial disputes, such as those mentioned earlier, suggest that a claim of historical ownership may shrink the set of acceptable outcomes, even eliminating compromise altogether. It may also lead to more military conflict. Huth (1996, 60–61, 98), for example, finds that there is a positive relationship between a state's historical loss of territory before 1950 and the probability of the state initiating a dispute to recover the territory after 1950. Effective control, or the uncontested administration of the land, is the principal legal claim and the basis of international law. However, historical claims, notably those grounded on priority and duration, are the most emotional. Cultural claims are based on the ties of a group of people to one another and to the land. Territorial integrity is built on the perceived sense of unity of landmasses. Economic claims maintain that control of territories is essential to the viability of the claimant state. Elitist claims assert that a particular minority has the power of dominion in a territory. Ideological claims arise from an ideology itself. The first four categories are conservative and are generally the strongest; the other three tend to be dynamic.

2.1 Early Exploration and Discovery

Expedition after expedition was sent forth throughout the 15th century to explore the coast of Africa. In 1445 the Portuguese navigator Dinís Dias reached the mouth of the Sénégal, which “men say comes from the Nile, being one of the most glorious rivers of Earth, flowing from the Garden of Eden and the earthly paradise.” Once the desert coast had been

passed, the sailors pushed on: in 1455 and 1456 Alvise Ca' da Mosto made voyages to Gambia and the Cape Verde Islands. Prince Henry died in 1460 after a career that had brought the colonization of the Madeira Islands and the Azores and the traversal of the African coast to Sierra Leone. Henry's captain, Diogo Cão, discovered the Congo River in 1482. All seemed promising; trade was good with the riverine peoples, and the coast was trending hopefully eastward. Then the disappointing fact was realized: the head of a great gulf had been reached, and, beyond, the coast seemed to stretch endlessly southward. Yet, when Columbus sought backing for his plan to sail westward across the Atlantic to the Indies, he was refused—"seeing that King John II [of Portugal] ordered the coast of Africa to be explored with the intention of going by that route to India."

King John II sought to establish two routes: the first, a land and sea route through Egypt and Ethiopia to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and, the second, a sea route around the southern shores of Africa, the latter an act of faith, since Ptolemy's map showed a landlocked Indian Ocean. In 1487, a Portuguese emissary, Pêro da Covilhã, successfully followed the first route; but, on returning to Cairo, he reported that, in order to travel to India, the Portuguese "could navigate by their coasts and the seas of Guinea." In the same year, another Portuguese navigator, Bartolomeu Dias, found encouraging evidence that this was so. In 1487 he rounded the Cape of Storms in such bad weather that he did not see it, but he satisfied himself that the coast was now trending northeastward; before turning back, he reached the Great Fish River, in what is now South Africa.

2.2 Initial Territorial Claims

While the empirical evidence linking territorial disputes to militarized conflict is strong, theoretical explanations about why territorial issues are so conflict-prone vary. Early theorists emphasized contiguity, arguing that conflict is more likely between contiguous or nearby states, because of enhanced military reach and/or greater opportunities for interaction. argues instead that the explanation lies in territoriality, "the tendency for humans to occupy and, if necessary, defend territory." Like other vertebrates, humans are aggressive in their attempt to keep and gain territory, and we should expect that "two states bordering on each other will use aggressive displays to establish a border in areas where they meet". However,

territorial disagreements will not always lead to war; Vasquez contends that territorial disputes are only likely to end in war if disputants employ realpolitik strategies.

2.3 Pre-existing International Tensions

International issues that existed before have a great influence on the discussion about the governance of Antarctica. Despite the fact that it is believed to be an area of peace and scientific research, the Antarctic Treaty System has just frozen the conflicts which remained unresolved. First, territorial disputes exist, particularly between the UK, Argentina, and Chile, being fueled by the old history of confrontation, for instance, the Falklands War.

Moreover, geopolitical rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia makes this area an arena of competition despite the presence of scientific exploration. Natural resource management debates also affect the region because, while the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty does not allow any exploitation, there are countries who want future access to resources, and some others prefer to protect the environment.

All this means that Antarctica cannot be regarded as an area where no problems take place.

3. Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Disputes

3.1 Claimant States and Their Justifications

Disputes are an inevitable part of international relations and it is hardly deniable that, among international disputes, territorial and territorial-related disputes are the most complicated ones. Undoubtedly, these disputes have been the primary source of the growing tension in relations among States which is likely to lead to armed conflicts or eventful wars when they are not settled amicably and peacefully. The sanctity of the territorial issue to the peoples in question - nationalism and the associated passions - have made these disputes extremely difficult to resolve. Furthermore, these disputes have been further complicated by historical, cultural, political, military and economic phenomena. Nevertheless, States are required, under international law, to resolve their international disputes by peaceful means and in

conformity with the principles of justice and international law so that international peace, security, and justice will not be breached.

3.2 Overlapping Claims and Regional Conflicts

With the end of WWII, as well as after the end of the Cold War, states increasingly cooperated with one another and created numerous international organisations (IOs) and regimes. In addition, states pursued regional cooperation and integration, as a result of which ROs have emerged around the globe. The scholarship on regional integration and comparative regionalism has equally evolved in multiple waves. Regional integration has been in the limelight of research for several decades. Early integration scholars studied predominantly why and under which conditions states create regional organisations. A second wave of regional integration scholarship focused on the dynamics driving the development and evolution of regional organisation. On this basis, scholars turned towards studying the interaction between state and regional levels, focusing on how regional policies are made and how a regional organisation impacts its member states. However, scholars working on regionalism have pointed out that regional cooperation in ROs is not confined to Europe, but takes place all over the globe, and they seek to overcome the integration scholarship's EU bias

An influential strand in the literature has often been referred to as the 'new regionalism'. New regionalism points to a multitude of new trends and developments, such as institutional designs, and the role of non-state actors. Most importantly, scholars underline the different world order contexts between the earlier and recent regionalism waves. Only recently have these cleavages been overcome, and some observers even claim that today's world order is a regional world order. Debates revolve around the increasing complexity of regionalism and the many interactions between state and non-state actors, institutions, and processes at multiple levels. One such phenomenon is overlapping regionalism, which results from the fact that states tend to join not only one RO but also several at the same time, creating overlaps between ROs not only in regard to membership but also in regard to policy mandates. Although this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been studied in comprehensive empirical detail. The so-called 'spaghetti-bowl phenomenon' was first noted by International Political Economy scholars studying regional preferential and free trade agreements, and was later developed by the regime complexity literature. Empirical studies have focused on policy fields as diverse as security, trade, or environment and climate change. These contributions describe and categorise the empirical phenomena of single instances of overlapping regimes (including

ROs) and provide important work on actors or impact. Yet, they do not explore why states choose to join multiple regional projects. As such, the literature has not explored whether or not overlap is prevalent and persistent across regions and why this might be so. The emerging literature on overlapping regionalism is qualitative in nature. There are several empirically rich and detailed case studies examining how ROs in a specific region overlap. Some scholars emphasize shedding light on the drivers of overlapping regionalism. For example, Mwilima (2015) argues that overlapping regionalism in Africa is a by-product of both external actors pushing for region-building (e.g. the EU seeking to foster the EAC) and states striving to increase their economic welfare. Others have mapped out the overlapping regionalism and have looked more closely into the consequences of ROs sharing member states and/or having overlapping policy mandates. Nolte has inquired how strongly ROs are interconnected, and has shed light on whether they react to overlaps at all and, if so, whether they opt for cooperation or competition. For Europe, Koschut has selected two ROs, the EU and NATO, inquired how a security policy overlap emerged in the late 1990s, and then examined how NATO and the EU have subsequently reacted to the overlap in a cooperative manner, by engaging in a division of labour. In order to complement the qualitative literature and to contribute to our knowledge of overlapping regionalism, and ultimately also about its drivers and consequences, we adopt a comparative perspective. We look at all currently present ROs and map comprehensively the extent to which they share member states and policy competencies (overlapping regionalism). Within the scope of this paper, we cannot systematically examine drivers and consequences, but we provide first accounts for today's pattern of overlapping regionalism, followed by suggestions for future research to systematically examine the responses to overlaps as well as the respective consequences for member states and ROs.

3.3 Mapping overlapping regionalism

We define ROs as institutions (with a set of primary and secondary rules, headquarters or a secretariat) in which states cooperate regularly on more than one narrow issue area and in which membership is based on criteria related to the geographical location of the applicant state. RO membership is not exclusive; thus, states can join several ROs. Our study includes 62 ROs across four macro-regions (Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe) and all 203 sovereign states and autonomous territories that can potentially be members in ROs in 2012. Whenever ROs not only share member states but also have at least one similar policy competence, we speak of overlapping regionalism. In this article, we shed light on the extent of overlapping regionalism as of 2012. In order to do so, we adopt a state-based perspective in a first step, in which we inquire into multiple RO memberships of states. In a second step, we adopt an RO-based perspective and examine the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism, which occurs when ROs share membership and have similar policy competencies. The subsequent section discusses potential rule conflicts between ROs and

sheds light on the potential prevalence of such rule conflicts for states, and specifies why we need to account for variation in multiple RO membership of states (DV1) as well as variation in overlapping regionalism between ROs

4. Geopolitical Context of the Period

4.1 Cold War Dynamics and Superpower Rivalry

By the end of the 1950s, the “Great Game” of the 20th century the Cold War was finding a new, frozen theater. The New York Times stated that in 1958 that Antarctica was no longer a “continent of penguins and explorers” but a “strategic void” that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were in a race to fill. There were fears not just of land grabs but also that the continent could be used as a clandestine launch site for the nascent Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). If one side got a foothold, the whole Southern Hemisphere’s security architecture would collapse.

The sudden Soviet desire to put permanent stations on the continent during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) came as a shock to Washington. Reuters wrote in a 2015 retrospective how the Eisenhower administration saw the Soviet intrusion into the “Pole of Inaccessibility” as a symbolic challenge to Western supremacy in the Southern Oceans. The idea of a nuclear armed Antarctica was not science fiction, but a real and urgent intelligence question. This dynamic competition gave birth to a paradoxical situation: while the continent was uninhabited, it was one of the most “crowded” diplomatic spaces in the world.

In addition, the domestic politics of each superpower heavily influenced. For the US, forfeiting “rights” to Antarctica would be perceived as weakness in the face of communism. In the case of the USSR, demanding their right to exist there was a way to say that they were a world power with interests spanning from the North Pole to the South. This “Zero Sum Game” mentality brought about a tit-for-tat action in which all actions of one side were restrained by the other, and eventually, the two sides suddenly started scrambling to build “scientific” bases that began to bear military outpost features.

In the end, geopolitical tensions were inflated into a “Denial Strategy.” The main task of Western diplomacy was to deny the Soviets the use of the continent for military purposes, and for the Soviets to ensure their inclusion in any future division of the spoils. The stalemate created a climate where without multilateral accord the “Cold War” was in danger of turning “Hot,” over the coldest spot on the planet.

Building on this base the world recognized that military personnel in the guise of researchers was a powder keg for international relations. The intelligence agencies in Washington and Moscow were both fully cognizant that such permanent installations on ice could later be converted into staging points for naval forces or long range reconnaissance. This resulted in a series of intense shadow scrapping where new meteorological towers were analyzed for possible covert use as radar installations for other uses.

All of this complicated matters, especially since inside the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation, members such as Britain and France believed that their own claims in the south were being overwhelmed by the industrial might of the American and Soviet expeditions. This Western bloc infighting gave the Soviets diplomatic opportunities to question the validity of the whole system of colonial claims. By claiming to be the defenders of open scientific access the Soviets put the US in a difficult position, where it had to decide whether to stand by its traditional European allies or take an internationalist position that would enable it to avoid a full-scale war.

Under these high-pressure conditions, a permanent treaty was the only alternative to war over the last “blank” on the map of the earth. In the region’s diplomatic archives stands the desperate search for a legal formula that would enable them to satisfy the proud national dignity of the claimant states and meet the security needs of the non claimant superpowers. The finished product was an atmosphere of deliberate caution, in which every word of every draft was scrutinized for its potential to set off a naval deployment in the waters of the subantarctic. It was an era when the ice was not only a physical obstacle but a psychological screen upon which to project the worst fears of a world threatened by the atomic age.

4.2 Role of Non-Aligned States

Developing on this line of thought, the rise of the Non Aligned movement rather shifted Antarctica from a mere cold war playing field into a key axis of the emerging post colonial discourse. In the new unity fostered by these recently sovereign states at the United Nations, they used the frozen continent as a symbolic litigation test case for the future of international law and resource equity. The leadership of Nehru and Nasser was more representative of a general rejection of the partitioning of the world in the nineteenth century, and they argued that the legal void within the polar regions should not be occupied by the flags of the few, but by the governance of the many. This ideological momentum led the established powers to recognize that a bilateral agreement among the dozen or so IGY participants would be very seriously challenged in world opinion.

The anxieties about a new colonialism were not simply rhetoric but a realistic response to the accelerating pace of technology that made exploitation of the poles beginning to appear feasible. Non-Aligned diplomats countered that if the Antarctic were to be divided up in national sectors, such a move would give the Global South a permanent geographical disadvantage by effectively granting a strategic monopoly over the planet’s southern confines. Their efforts to promote a global-commons model were intended to ensure that any future mining of minerals or biological riches would be conducted under a system of universal benefit rather than in the hands of the historic naval powers. It was a huge diplomatic headache for countries such as Australia and New Zealand, who contended that their geographic and historical natural rights could not simply be signed away to a global committee.

On an ethical level, the Non Aligned countries triumphed in associating the frozen deserts of the south with the burning political battles over decolonization raging along the equator. By depicting the territorial claims as holdovers from a waning imperial age, they were able

to recast the Antarctic question as a litmus test for the new world order. This meant European claimants had to defend their claims not only legally, but morally, and it was often difficult for them to articulate why a place without an indigenous population ought to be subjected to the same colonial logic being undermined in so many parts of the globe.

The relentless lobbying by these countries broke the Cold War binary stalemate by inserting a third set of prerogatives that Washington and Moscow could not overlook. Their participation guaranteed that the continent's ultimate container would need to include a fraction of scientific openness and a ban on new territorial assertions that neutralized the more predatory kinds of polar expansionism. In demanding a seat at the table for the Global South, they laid the groundwork for a more nuanced, multilateral management of the planet and made sure the final frontier would be a one of a kind experiment in international cooperation, rather than a final footnote in the annals of empire.

4.3 Strategic Concerns: Militarization and Security

Building on these strategic concerns, the militarization of the Antarctic was an emblematic change in how world naval power was measured at the closing stage of the decade. One of the tactical implications of the Southern Ocean is that it became the focus for maritime doctrine after the Suez Canal proved that the world's most important commercial arteries could be cut off at any time. And this understanding caused the Drake Passage to become a high stakes highway where the presence of even one hostile warship could dictate international trade between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. As a result, the Antarctic Peninsula was no longer regarded as a barren strip of ice, but rather as a permanent aircraft carrier that might control the world's greatest maritime funnel.

The nightmare of sub ice warfare took on a new and frightening aspect in the global nuclear standoff, because the deep trenches encircling the continent became hideaways for the advanced ballistic missile submarines. The concern among the naval brass was that the thermal layers combined with the physical wall of the ice shelves would significantly degrade sonar performance, thus creating a "sanctuary" where a retaliatory strike could be planned in complete secrecy. This possibility inspired a frantic race for bathymetric information as the United States and Soviet Union raced to chart the underwater canyons of the Southern Ocean to establish a stealth advantage.

For the claimant states in South America, not only was the presence of foreign military bases a strategic threat but it was also a profound insult to their national identity tied to their vision of geographical continuity. Chile and Argentina insisted that the Antarctic was a natural extension of their land, and have been projecting national borders on the continent that include these icy expanses as provinces. The gunfire at Hope Bay in nineteen fifty-two would warn that these countries were prepared to risk an international crisis to resist what they saw as a second wave of European colonization. Their visceral opposition to foreign landings forced the world community to acknowledge that any attempt to rule the region without confronting these local fears would invite a never ending state of minor violence.

To de-escalate this frontier tension in the long run would require a revolutionary conception of international security that ignored the defense of territory. The threat was described as a situation in which a small incident on the border could get out of control and lead to a full scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Establishing a firm buffer zone was a mechanical requirement to stop the continent from turning into a permanent minefield that would suck the resources and imperil the entirety of the Southern Hemisphere. With the military aspect completely removed, the above structure was intended to serve as a unique domain in which the standard rules of geopolitical belligerency were put on hold for a thin but operational peace.

5. Scientific Cooperation and Technological Development

5.1 Role of Scientific Research in Antarctica

Developmentally, telling science stories allowed the use of science as a tool of diplomacy in a way that created a unique geopolitical presence that territorial claims in themselves could not. In a manner of speaking the International Geophysical Year had become the way in which nations could send their logistical projection into the furthest reaches of the planet while avoiding the legal ruckus of traditional annexation. Included among Amundsen Scott South Pole Station, a symbol of American technical power (implicitly dedicated to upper atmospheric and terrestrial magnetic studies), were a number of iconic buildings constructed during this era. As such, the gathering of information (i.e., the research) became a permissible proxy for land grabbing, creating a system whereby the amount of published research was considered a measure of a nation's right to be the ice.

This phenomenon of cooperation by necessity was born out of the harsh reality that the Antarctic encompasses a climate that is inhospitable to all human life, no matter your politics. In the context of the Soviet Union's establishment of Vostok Station deep in one of the most remote and frigid parts of the continent, the mutual hazards of equipment breakdown and medical emergencies required a degree of cross bloc communication that simply did not exist in Europe or Asia. Science journals of the time that began to chronicle cases in which radio operators on different national bases shared life-saving meteorological warnings for transcontinental flights.

However, the "Trojan horse" reality remained a constant source of concern for intelligence agencies, who understood that seismographs could easily be repurposed to track distant atomic vibrations. The dual-use nature of polar technology meant that every deep-sea ice-drilling project was met with a mixture of admiration and intense suspicion; after all, the same equipment could potentially be used to deploy covert sensors to track submarine movements in the southern oceans. This tension led to the development of a unique polar culture, characterized by a paradoxical combination of genuine camaraderie among field scientists and cold, calculating surveillance on the part of administrative staff. The Times newspaper's historical accounts often hinted at this shadow play, noting that the civilian

veneer of many expeditions was a thin veil over a robust military logistical infrastructure designed for long-term strategic sustainability.

As a result, the concept of Antarctica as a scientific continent provided a brilliant legal path for a world paralyzed by sovereignty disputes. International negotiators secured the creation of a haven where traditional property rights became irrelevant in the face of a shared pursuit of knowledge, elevating the status of explorer above that of soldier or colonizer. This transformation ensured that as long as a country contributed to the global scientific pool, its existence would be tolerated and even embraced by its rivals. This fundamental shift in emphasis from rock ownership to laboratory access set a precedent for global governance that subsequently influenced the governance of outer space and the deep seabed, proving that science could be the most effective language of peace in an era of total war.

5.2 International Scientific Initiatives

Building on 44 this history, the International Geophysical Year was the turning point that transformed the Antarctic from a set of mirage-like maps into a measurable scientific entity. The IGY (1957-58) became the largest scientific enterprise ever. Some 30,000 scientists from 66 countries participated worldwide, but Antarctica was the jewel in the crown of the exercise. National Geographic called the venture "Humanity's Great Leap Southward." This was the first time the "Unknown Continent" had been charted to any extent, with the aid of new technology such as long-range aircraft, motorized sleds, and sophisticated radio communications. This leg of full-scale exploration exploited the entire inventory of post war industry and science to penetrate the southern icecap, and uncover that the place was not a simple dead frozen desert but a dynamic & multilayered system encompassing kilometers holding the secrets of the planet's atmospheric history and possibly future climate stability.

The effect of this activity, was to generate a "Diplomatic Momentum." The IGY participants 12 countries that had established bases on the continent couldn't simply pack up and head home. They had sunk millions and man-years of labor. They required a permanent legal regime to safeguard their investments. The IGY changed the world from "Why should we be there?" "How do we stay there without fighting?" This physical presence on the ice created a huge stabilizing influence, as all the participating governments knew that they could not risk destroying the infrastructure they had created by reigniting claims through a reversion to unilateral territorial seizure. The debate became less of a philosophical argument about whether or not polar exploration was necessary and more a practical discussion over what kind of governmental apparatus was necessary to maintain a quasi permanent presence that did not spark a military incident in the southern seas.

These initiatives also pointed to the "Technological Gap." Hardly more than a handful of countries possessed the icebreakers and heavy lift aircraft required to work in the interior. This began to pit the "Space Age" powers against the rest of the world. Scientific American noted the importance of the information on the ozone layer, magnetism, and global weather patterns being gathered was for the whole world, not just the countries that gathered it. This

gap was causing a secondary tier of tension in international bodies, with the Third World complaining bitterly that the secrets of the Earth were being locked up by a technological elite.

Now the attention has to be on how to sustain this. A standing international agency to monitor research may be the key to preventing the “Scientific Initiatives” of the future from devolving into a “Pay to Play” system in which the wealthiest nations alone have a voice. The IGY was a temporary miracle; the challenge now is to make that miracle last. In the absence of a strong and open set of treaties to guide these activities, there is a lingering risk that Antarctic science will be used as a tool for national prestige rather than for the good of all humankind. The lesson of this era is that global scientific success is best when it is insulated from the immediate political and economic interest of states, requiring a creation that shields the cooperative spirit that reached its peak in the late fifties yet can respond to the increasing calls for a more just stewardship of the final frontier.

5.3 Sharing of Scientific Knowledge

Building on the diplomatic dimensions of information dissemination, the transition to a single polar database was a departure from standard mid-twentieth-century operating procedures. Information was power in the 1950s, and in the Cold War, power was usually hidden. But the AP had a story on a tectonic shift in Antarctica: the principle of "Open Data." During the IGY, the leaders in each country had made an agreement to share the results through World Data Centers. This meant that a Soviet finding on ice shelf thickness was instantly accessible to an American glaciologist. This transparency was the ultimate “Confidence Building Measure” (CBM). This radical transparency served as a model for the current open science movements, and represented an exceptional case where the quest for empirical truth trumped national instincts for secrecy, and thus effectively bridged two otherwise antithetical political philosophies.

The exchange of knowledge had a more strategic end, even if unarticulated. If all the science were open, no country could say that it was doing "top secret military research.". The best protection against the militarization of the continent was transparency. If a base said it was doing ‘Ionospheric Research,’ but was unwilling to make their data public well, then we’d all know something was really wrong. This institutionalized need to make data for public consumption served as a kind of inspection system itself lack of data from any given site being a red flag for intelligence services everywhere. Treating the laboratory as the most important unit of Antarctic life, the international community had, in effect, turned every scientist into a peacekeeper whose very presence was a guarantee of peace: any deviation from the research mandate would be exposed to global scrutiny.

Nonetheless, there were major obstacles. The Washington Post wrote that although “pure science” was shared, “applied science,” such as mapping for possible mineral extraction, was generally concealed. There was also the matter of “Language Barriers” and the intense

physical challenge of transporting data from the South Pole to the rest of the planet. The technology of 1959 was based on Morse code and slow radio communication, then “Real Time Sharing” was a pipe dream. These logistical limitations meant that, if not the letter of the data sharing was the spirit of the data sharing, then duly hampered by the technological delays and failures. The challenge of rendering complicated Soviet geophysical papers “into English or American atmospheric data” into Russian meant that the intellectual product of this work, in a practical sense, was something that truly took a lot of effort, often months of post expedition analysis before the results could be fully taken advantage of by the international community.

The institutionalization of this sharing is crucial. The shift from a “Gentleman’s Agreement” to a “Compulsory Disclosure” rule would make the sharing of information the “glue” binding the Antarctic community together. When the flow of information stops, trust disappears, and the continent could once again become a theater of conflict. For the sake of long-term stability, the international system must evolve into a more rigid legal system that...

6. Resource Potential and Economic Interests

6.1 Natural Resources and Future Exploitation

By the end of the 1950s, “the Frozen Frontier” was looking more and more like “the frozen hinterlands of industrial feasibility.” The Wall Street Journal ran a story speculating that the Transantarctic Mountains are just a southern fork of the mineral laden Andes. Geological reconnaissance made during the IGY indicated enormous deposits of low grade coal and high grade iron ore. The real “prize,” however, was offshore. “Lloyd’s List,” along with other maritime journals, began to report on the almost certain existence of huge hydrocarbon reserves, oil and natural gas, under the Weddell and Ross Seas.

Though the equipment to perform deep water drilling beneath arctic ice is still decades away, the mere existence of such resources alter the diplomatic calculus. Countries weren’t just fighting for “prestige” anymore, they were battling for the energy security of the 21st century. This shifted the emphasis from pure science to “Economic Anticipation.” Governments realized they could be cut out of a trillion dollar resource boom if they didn’t get a claim now.

And, when it comes to biological resources they had already been exploited. Soviet and Japanese fleets were reported by Fishing Gazette to be turning more and more towards the Southern Ocean’s krill as a solution to world protein shortages. The Antarctic Crithidia. Some speculation was rife that krill, the base of the Antarctic food web, was a huge, hitherto untapped commercial fishery. The financial speculation was not just subterranean; it was wallowing in the icy depths and running wild like an unregulated stampede on land, threatening to burst the ocean’s bank.

The question remains whether Antarctica is a "Bank Vault" to be opened or a "Sanctuary" to be locked. If global policy moves toward a model of exploitation, how will the profits be shared? Will the technologically advanced "North" monopolize the resources, or will there be a mechanism for global redistribution? This is the core of the economic debate that divides the "industrial powers" from the "developing world."

6.2 Risks of Resource Competition

Further illustrating the instability of extractive ambitions, the potential for a sudden stampede toward the continent's unexploited riches emerges as one of the biggest threats to the tenuous peace that has prevailed over the course of the research years. The problem with "Resource Fever" is that diplomacy is often neglected in favour of "Facts on the Ground." The Economist cautioned in a 1959 editorial that the scramble for Antarctic minerals could become a new 19th century "Scramble for Africa" whereby European powers carved up the continent with lines on a map and ignited decades of warfare. Stakes are higher in Antarctica because the environment is so hostile; a "Resource War" there wouldn't just be a military disaster, it would be a logistic and humanitarian one. This historical analogy stands as a strong cautionary tale that in the absence of a pre-emptive legal ban on mining, the southern border could rapidly turn into a belligerent arena of new colonial expansion where rule of law is usurped by dictate of the most powerful industry.

Oil proves that history teaches us nothing. Correspondents for Reuters observed that the competing claims of the UK, Chile and Argentina were closely aligned with the notion that the Antarctic Peninsula was the most "accessible" region of the continent for extraction. Should a country drill for oil in a contested area, the current "gentleman's agreements" would disappear overnight. The concern is that economic greed could become a catalyst for military escalation, turning scientific stations into walled mining compounds. Such a conversion would represent a devastating collapse of the continent's role as sanctuary for knowledge, with scientists likely superseded by security detachments and industrial engineers. Cold conditions add a layer of difficulty to resource extraction, and any such enterprise would require a huge military-industrial presence, further invading the untouched wilds and making any future return to peaceful cooperation increasingly improbable. The psychological influence of possible riches on states can cloud rational thinking, incentivizing a "Pre-emptive Claim" strategy, in which states move into territory not because of its present usefulness, but because of its prospective market value. This kind of speculative geopolitics is especially perilous in the Antarctic because its lack of defined borders demonstrates aggressive posturing. Should a seismic survey reveal a huge deposit of gold or uranium in a contested area, chances are the incentive to keep up a "scientific" front would collapse in the face of national economic priorities. Accordingly, the international community must come to understand that preventing such a scenario requires a move beyond temporary ceasefires toward an effective ban on commercial extraction, removing "Resource Fever" from the diplomatic playing field before it triggers a runaway global disaster.

6.3 Regulation of Resource Extraction

Complicating issues of jurisdiction, the discussion over the frozen continent now is not, as it was in the 19th century, merely one of exploration but of international law unprecedented in its reach. When the legal minds of Foreign Affairs turned to the "Legal Vacuum" as it pertained to Antarctic minerals, the seeds of several articles here were planted. Under current international law, there is no clear entity that could grant mining licences on land that belongs to nobody (and everybody). If a firm begins drilling on a location claimed by several countries, in whose name are the taxes paid? Which environmental regulations do they abide by? The absence of regulation is a perfect formula for international corporate chaos. In the absence of a sovereign mooring, any industry would find itself in a permanent state of legal opaqueness, in which the intersecting claims of states would create a jurisdictional quagmire that might easily erupt from corporate litigation to full-scale naval warfare. Some have called for a "Global Mining Authority," a body that would grant licenses and collect fees that would be redirected into global development. "Antarctica Socialist Model" Capitalist Powers spat the socialist model and cried for "Freedom of Enterprise." The Financial Times remarked that the argument was really a snapshot of the worldwide battle between planned and market economies.

This was not just an Antarctic issue Antarctica was becoming the proving ground for a new type of international economic law. This ideological battle exemplifies the general increasing difficulty of governing a place that exists beyond the confines of the traditional Westphalian system of nation states, as it compels the international community to decide whether the potential riches of the south belong to the capital holders capable of extracting them, or are held in a collective treasury accessible to all humanity. Regulation is also about the "Technology Gap." Only a select group of the world's major powers possessed the heavy machinery necessary to even think about extraction. Thus, "regulation" was viewed by many smaller states as a means for a handful of powers to write the rules in their own interests.

The rights of "pioneers" who take the risks need to be balanced with the rights of the "silent majority" of nations that can't yet get to the ice in any regulatory regime. This discrepancy creates deep mistrust everywhere in the global south where the fear is that a "First Come First Served" doctrine will essentially re-legalize nineteenth century colonial patterns under the guise of modern industrial progress. How this gap is navigated is more than just technical but also a moral question and will involve a system that recognizes the enormous capital expenditures of the superpowers while at the same time safeguarding the future interests of the developing world. Writing a "Code of Conduct" is a huge challenge. Would it be the equivalent of a total ban, the creation of a regulated market or a global monopoly? The result will decide if Antarctica continues to function as a peaceful laboratory for the Earth or is transformed into a colonial mine. Any law that privileges one bloc will be beaten back by the other, and the continent will be left in a precarious legal limbo.

The stakes for these talks are even higher because, as one legal expert explained to me, "whatever rules the parties develop for Antarctica will almost certainly set a precedent for how the deep sea beds - and even outer space - will be governed in the future." Hence, seeking to build a consensus-based regulatory regime is a race to provide a rule of law before the ability to mine outstrips our collective ability to restrain to make sure the last big wilderness doesn't become the first great casualty of the industrial age.

7. Environmental and Ethical Considerations

7.1 Environmental Vulnerability of Antarctica

Building upon the new and never before encountered ecological impacts of living in the high latitudes, the rise of polar protection as a concern of world politics signaled a transformation in twentieth century visions of planetary well-being. While the world was preoccupied with the Cold War, National Geographic and Smithsonian were warning about the "Extreme Fragility" of the polar environment. In the late '50s, "Ecology" was still an alien concept to the political class – but the facts were irrefutable. Because of the intense cold, decay is biological almost non-existent. Old spills of fuel or waste from decades ago appear as fresh today as they were then. So human pollution does not “go away”; it just stacks up. This absence of natural dissipation results in a perpetual reservoir of human carelessness, where a small machinery leak may last for centuries, making every research site a prospective long term source of localized environmental toxicity. The New York Times chronicled the “hidden costs” of the IGY bases. Thousands of tons of equipment, drums of fuel and waste were being left behind on the ice. The snow, until then unspoiled, was being blackened with the soot of coal stoves and with liquid oil from spills of tractors. Scientists cautioned that Antarctica is the 'Heart of the World's Climate'; if albedo (reflectivity) of ice is modified through contamination or if the poise of Southern Ocean is disturbed, it would impact the entire world. This warning was a kind of foreshadowing of the now tightly linked Earth's systems, where the south becomes industrialized and a feedback loop ensues that darkens snow and absorbs more solar radiation, melts more ice and raises global sea levels that could threaten coastal civilizations thousands of miles away.

There was an ethical question: does the “right to explore” also include the “right to destroy”? Antarctica is the one place on Earth, uniquely, where man is the visitor and not the master. The BBC's natural history units claimed the continent as a “Last Eden” that should be guarded for its own sake rather than for what it could give to man. It was this that gave rise to “Environmental Ethics” in foreign policy, the concept that some locations are too sacred for business. This moral epiphany ran counter to the traditional utilitarian wilderness as a resource to be surmounted — placing the protection of the Antarctic as both a responsibility to future generations as well as a measure of the human.

The need to know and the need to preserve these are competing demands, and have to be balanced. When the international community turns a blind eye to the environment, it is preparing the ground for an ecological disaster that will be beyond cleanup. The environment is more than just a "green issue," it is a survival issue for the planet and its climate systems. As a result, any future governance arrangement will have to include rigorous waste management and environmental impact control as an essential condition for any activity on the ice. Understanding the Southern Ocean as a huge thermal stabilizer for the whole planet makes keeping it clean a matter of ultimate strategic importance, transitioning the scientist from a passive to active defender of the world's most critical and fragile thermostat.

7.2 Balancing Development and Conservation

The tension between "Economic Progress" and "Environmental Protection" is the central ethical dilemma of the modern age. *The Times of London* framed this as a clash between "Utility and Sanctity." For a world still recovering from World War II, the idea of leaving massive resources "under the rug" seemed like an unthinkable luxury. Yet, the cost of "Development" in Antarctica is higher than anywhere else on Earth.

Historical analysis points out that for the developing world, "Conservation" often looked like a trick by the rich nations to prevent others from getting wealthy. If established powers have already used their own resources to industrialize, on what grounds can they tell newly independent nations that they shouldn't touch Antarctic oil? This creates a "North South" divide that is as deep as the "East West" Cold War divide.

Conservation in Antarctica also requires "Transnational Enforcement." If one nation passes strict laws but their neighbor on the ice ignores them, the pollution will still spread. *Le Monde* argued that "Nature knows no borders," and therefore, environmental protection in Antarctica requires a certain surrender of sovereign independence. Nations must agree to let international inspectors visit their bases to check waste management, a level of transparency that was unheard of in 1959.

Finding a "Sustainable Path" means designating certain areas as "Special Protected Areas" while allowing limited development in others. But who decides which is which? Building an ethical framework that values the "Future Generations" as much as the current ones is a fundamental challenge. Antarctica is a test of whether humanity can be a "Responsible Steward" or just another "Apex Predator."

8. Existing International Efforts and Legal Gaps

8.1 Early Diplomatic Initiatives

Building on the background of polar diplomacy, the development of Antarctic management is a succession of high stakes diplomatic bumbles that almost culminated in the permanent closing off of the international system in the South. The road to the 1959 summit is littered with failed treaties. In 1948, however, the United States suggested an "Eight Power Merger" in which the claimant powers would establish a condominium. The *Washington Post* at the time said the plan was "dead on arrival" because it excluded the Soviet Union and failed to consult the international community. The Soviets retorted by saying they would not recognize any pact that they weren't a part of, citing their own historical discovery of the continent. This early failure illustrated the futility of trying to craft a back-door agreement among western powers that left out the ascendant power of the eastern bloc, because to exclude a superpower was to make the proposed legal boundaries unenforceable on a global rather than just regional scale.

A similar failure was the "Escudero Proposal" issued by Chile, proposing a "Modus Vivendi", a suspension of hostilities in which all parties would stop bickering over sovereignty and simply work together on science for a term of five years. The *Santiago Daily* praised it as a solution for the region, but the Great Powers considered it too feeble. It lacked teeth; it did not address the problem of militarization, or the long-term legal status of the territory. This plan, although good in that it put research first, did not address the deep anxieties over potential naval bases and permanent extractive operations, and so the questions of power and security were still left open. The fact that the Escudero plan was scorned showed that a simple ceasefire was not enough, that only a global reordering in international law could stop the continent from careening into chaos.

The early failures had taught the world a hard lesson: any treaty that attempted to address sovereignty would be doomed. The "Art of Diplomacy" in Antarctica is the "art of evasion," the *Manchester Guardian* reported. Because competing claimants cannot agree on who owns the land, they need another way to make ownership matter less. Those early efforts were the "flawed "experiments" that give way to the realisation a "Hybrid Model" is the only way forward." It were a complex legal construction involving a nation's claims, which were coyly maintained for domestic political consumption, while the land was treated as an international zone for the purposes of operations. By transferring emphasis from the issue of territorial possession to that of territorial function, the community of diplomats began to evolve a system that favored stability over the ultimate determination of frontiers.

They are such warnings from the past. Overreaching for a “National Map” usually ends you up getting nothing. The 1959 summit is our best hope of halting a turbulent disintegration of regional (and international) order in the making. The collapse of the 1948 and 1952 talks is why so much is at stake globally for peace in 1959. This final meeting is to be a critical juncture in the history of the century, with the international community confronted with the choice between moving back along the competitive colonial track of the past or forward to a revolutionary collective management system. The specters of these failed negotiations also remind us that when faced with insurmountable geographical challenges and raging ideological rivalries, the path to peace must be found in an extreme dedication to shared purpose, and a conscious braking of national pride.

8.2 Need for an International Governance Framework

Adding to the already complex jurisdictional issues confronting the international community, the absence of any semblance of administrative organization in the Antarctic posed a severe threat to the stability of international relations. By 1959, there was nowhere on earth without a government but Antarctica. As Reuters legal analysts noted, it was a “Legal No Man’s Land.” This wasn’t just a theoretical problem. If the opposing parties are scientists from different countries working at a foreign base, whose law applies? Without structure, the “Law of the Jungle” reigns, the strongest country in the region gets to make the rules. This absence of legal authority meant that routine matters like medical emergencies, criminal accusations, or even minor administrative disagreements could escalate into jingoistic disputes, because there was no established court or police force to defuse competing national interests on the ice.

The "legal vacuum" was there at sea as well. The notions of "Territorial Sea" and "Continental Shelf" were up for discussion in the UN, but Antarctica was *sui generis*. Does a "Claimed Sector" include the ocean in front of it? If a foreign ship can be seized in its waters, can it also seize foreign ships? The New York Times cautioned that “Naval Incidents” are growing as nations seek to police their own asserted “Maritime Zones.” This confusion at sea was especially perilous at a time when the Southern Ocean was of strategic importance to global shipping and biological resources. When no boundary was defined delineating a nation's reach and the start of international waters, the Southern Ocean was descending as a venue of high seas brinkmanship, where naval commanders were frequently required to resolve unclear commands under the pressure of what they perceived were the trespassing of foreigners.

The third issue there is the "third party problem." If four dozen countries sign onto such a treaty and one country goes and builds a base, are they bound by the treaty? Without a universally acceptable "Framework," all you are going to have is an agreement among friends. World needed ‘Constitutional Moment’ for Antarctic rules that would be accepted by world, not just 'Original Signatories’’: “This is how she describes the politics involved. This was the challenge to closed-door diplomacy in a world that was increasingly open: a state not party to the original agreement – indeed, any state – could walk away from the

environmental and demilitarization requirements and undermine the collective security of an entire continent. In order to be truly effective, the new order established a set of norms so advantageous and compelling for all states that no rational state would consider opting out of it. Filling these gaps is our top priority. Among others, for "Dispute Settlement," "Jurisdiction over Persons," and "Emergency Response." Without a clearly defined governance system, the "Anarchy of the Ice" will continue to menace world peace. Establishing this rule of law entails a radical reimagining of how to govern human presence in a land of no one, by way of the activity of the individual as opposed to the territory of the state. In setting out procedures for search and rescue and for the legal status of non-state actors, like private expeditions, the 1959 summit tries to displace the erratic forces of frontier justice with an ingenious and enduring framework of governance that can handle the pressures of the next century.

9. Possible Governance Models

9.1 Full Internationalization under the UN

Full internationalization under the UN involves managing global issues—like security, climate change, and economic development—through collaborative, multilateral action that transcends national borders. As a universal organization, the UN promotes this through sustainable development goals (SDGs), international law, and specialized agencies (like UNCTAD, UNDP, and UNEP) that foster cooperation between states rather than purely replacing national sovereignty.

Key Aspects of UN-Led Internationalization;

Preventive Diplomacy & Security: The UN provides a framework for collective security and peacekeeping to address transnational threats.

Global Norm Setting: The UN established international standards, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and covenants on civil, political, economic, and social rights.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): The 2030 Agenda promotes inclusive economic growth, reduced inequality, and climate action, with the High-Level Political Forum monitoring progress.

Economic Interdependence: The UN assists developing countries in dealing with globalization by strengthening trade capacity and promoting sustainable, equitable development, balancing national interests with global economic integration.

Addressing Transnational Challenges: Specialized bodies tackle issues that defy national boundaries, including pandemics (AIDS), big data, and climate change.

9.2 Territorial Sovereignty Model

Territorial sovereignty is a cornerstone of modern international relations. It gives states exclusive authority over defined geographic areas, including land, airspace, and territorial waters. This concept emerged in Europe during the late Middle Ages and was solidified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Today, territorial sovereignty faces challenges from globalization, supranational organizations, and non-state actors. These forces erode state control over economic and social policies, creating new spaces for interaction beyond traditional borders. Balancing sovereignty with global cooperation is a key challenge in our interconnected world. Territorial sovereignty refers to the exclusive right of a state to exercise supreme authority over a defined geographic area, including the land, airspace, and territorial waters within its borders

This authority includes the right to govern, make and enforce laws, and control the movement of people and goods within the territory. Territorial sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law and the modern state system, serving as the basis for the legal and political independence of states.

Globalization, characterized by the increasing flow of goods, services, people, and information across borders, has eroded the ability of states to control their own economic and social policies. The rise of global markets and transnational corporations has challenged the authority of states to regulate economic activity within their borders. The internet and social media have also created new spaces for communication and interaction that transcend traditional territorial boundaries

Territorial disputes can be resolved through a variety of means, including bilateral negotiations, mediation by third parties, and adjudication by international courts and tribunals

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has played a key role in resolving territorial disputes, issuing binding decisions in cases such as the territorial dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. Regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Organization of American States, have also developed mechanisms for resolving territorial disputes among their member states. In some cases, states have agreed to joint sovereignty or shared management of disputed territories, such as the arrangement between Sudan and South Sudan over the Abyei region

9.3 Hybrid Governance System

A hybrid regime is a type of political system often created as a result of an incomplete democratic transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one (or vice versa). Hybrid regimes are categorized as having a combination of autocratic features with democratic ones and can simultaneously hold political repressions and regular elections. According to some definitions and measures, hybrid regimes are commonly found in developing countries with abundant natural resources such as petro-states. Although these regimes experience civil unrest, they may be relatively stable and tenacious for decades at a time. There has been a rise in hybrid regimes since the end of the Cold War.

The term hybrid regime arises from a polymorphic view of political regimes that oppose the dichotomy of autocracy or democracy. Modern scholarly analysis of hybrid regimes focuses attention on the decorative nature of democratic institutions (elections do not lead to a change of power, different media broadcast the government point of view and the opposition in parliament votes the same way as the ruling party, among others),[from which it is concluded that democratic backsliding, a transition to authoritarianism, is the most prevalent basis of hybrid regimes. Some scholars also contend that hybrid regimes may imitate a full dictatorship.

Overall, there is no consensus among researchers about how hybrid regimes should be defined or measured. Accordingly, there is much disagreement about which countries are considered to be hybrid regimes, and any description of what typical hybrid regimes look like needs to be seen in the context of specific definitions and measures.

10. Challenges in Implementation

10.1 Political Disagreements Between States

The state is a crucial actor in all political conflict processes, both with actors in the external (interstate) environment and actors in the internal (intrastate) environment. Historically, the state system has dominated political processes and our capabilities to measure and analyze those processes since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The interests of state (or national) security are critically affected by political conflicts and, so, the state, as the primary collector and recorder of social science data has been in position to actively suppress or distort information regarding political conflict behavior, especially as political conflict often poses a direct challenge to the viability of the state itself. The suppression of information in the interests of state security is most effective in regard to internal conflicts, as the sovereign state has long held a virtual monopoly over information on its internal affairs. Of course, the complex motives and incentives to suppress or distort reports concerning serious political conflict episodes affect all parties that are directly involved or have important stakes in the outcome. Disinformation has strong security and strategic value for all parties involved, often leading to wide discrepancies in key information. Great caution is required when measuring political conflict; multiple reports should be acquired whenever possible, and sources should be evaluated for reliability.

Nearly all political conflicts in international affairs are channeled through and controlled by the institutions of states; thus, the concentration of power in the state system at once greatly reduces the number of potential conflict actors and imposes discipline on the course of conflict interactions through international norms and law (despite the popular fiction of an anarchic world system). Political conflict between states enjoys greater visibility than that within states, as the concentration of power in states greatly increases the conflict potential between states, thus commanding greater attention, and (2) there are in all cases at least two independent actors and, therefore, two independent seats of information gathering and dissemination. In addition, conflict between states is more institutionalized and public and, so, more likely to be observed and recorded by private parties and representatives from disinterested states. Political conflict within states, in addition to being overshadowed by the security interests of the state, is largely ad hoc, undisciplined, complex, and diffuse. For all these reasons, the systematic measurement and analysis of external political conflict has progressed more rapidly than has the measurement and analysis of internal political conflict.

Quantification in studies of the most extreme (violent) forms of political conflict is a relatively recent addition to the social sciences. The systematic quantification of the problem

of interstate war was greatly aided by the high profile of the institution of war in state politics, human fascination with the spectacle and horror of war, and the preeminent place of war in the historical record. The pioneering work in the quantification of classical wars is Quincy Wright's 1942 work titled *A Study of War*. In that study, Wright codified "all hostilities involving members of the family of nations [independent states] ... which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or which involved over 50,000 troops." Wright's very narrow, statist treatment of the problem of political conflict as a legal condition of war between sovereign states fits neatly within the conventional "state security" perspective. Wright's threshold for identifying only the highest profile cases of political conflict ensured that his collection of cases would be comprehensive, given the limitations on information. An alternative perspective was offered in the work of Lewis Richardson in his 1960 study titled *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, which purported to include all political events that involved a "quarrel" (i.e., a hostile dispute) and at least one fatality. Lewis' very low threshold for identifying cases guaranteed failure, as such detailed information was not generally available at that time. However, Lewis' broad approach to the measurement of violent political conflict in many ways foreshadows the emergence of the "human security" perspective in the late 20th century.

A major point of difference between the approaches taken by Wright and Richardson concerns their conceptions of the "most fundamental problem requiring solution," that is, problemation. Both accept that the transformation of political conflict to the systematic use of violence is the core of the problem. However, Wright takes the conventional approach in assuming that distinct forms of political violence events, or events occurring at different "levels of analysis" (i.e., individual, state, and system levels), can be identified and categorized, and that the within-category causal relationships are fundamentally similar, whereas the causal relationships across categories are fundamentally different.

10.2 Enforcement and Compliance

The rules which states and other actors must follow under Antarctic governance become enforceable through the systems which bring about compliance. The Antarctic Treaty System establishes legal structures but depends on members to work together voluntarily because it does not have a powerful centralized body for enforcement. The existing rules create a major challenge because organizations face difficulties when trying to maintain ongoing rule compliance by all involved parties.

A key issue is the absence of a binding enforcement authority. The international system lacks a single organization which can apply sanctions and conduct direct actions to address violations. The system requires states to build trust through open communication. Diplomatic strategies which both parties must follow to achieve their goals. States tend to apply rules differently because they choose to protect their national interests instead of following the common agreements. Monitoring and verification are also central to compliance. The present systems depend on three main components, which include inspections, self-reporting, and restricted monitoring systems. The methods which people use fail to provide enough results in all situations. The process of compliance improvement needs better monitoring tools which should include satellite surveillance and data-sharing systems together with scheduled international inspections to verify that operations follow established standards.

Accountability is another significant consideration. Rules are likely to lose their force without the presence of penalties. Potential solutions could include incorporating incremental penalties, publishing violation information, or submitting disputes to international courts. Nevertheless, such options need to be developed carefully to ensure that they do not compromise state sovereignty, a highly contentious matter in global affairs. Lastly, enhancing compliance requires inclusiveness and impartiality. The likelihood of states adhering to rules increases when the rule-making process appears fair and reasonable. Hence, trust-building, equality, and communication are fundamental aspects of the enforcement process.

In summary, enforcement and compliance are undoubtedly one of the most significant weaknesses of Antarctic governance but also the most crucial elements of any future rule-making mechanism.

11. Questions to be Addressed

1-How can decision-making within the Antarctic Treaty System be made more transparent and accountable to the global community?

2-What mechanisms can be introduced to ensure equal participation of non-treaty and observer states in Antarctic governance?

3-Should there be a centralized global authority to coordinate all Antarctic activities, and if so, what powers should it hold?

4-How can compliance and enforcement be strengthened without violating state sovereignty?

5-What role should international courts or arbitration bodies play in resolving disputes related to Antarctic governance?

6-How can technological advancements (AI, satellite monitoring, autonomous systems) be integrated into Antarctic governance frameworks?

7-Should private actors (corporations, research institutions) have a formal role in Antarctic decision-making processes?

8-What financial mechanisms can be established to support less developed countries' involvement in Antarctic affairs?

9-Should there be mandatory reporting and auditing systems for all activities conducted in Antarctica?